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The topic of this dissertation is dicussing whether it is still reasonable for 
keeping the traditional epistemology, which developes knowledge and thinking 
basically by using the way of “I know…” and “I think…”. The conclusion is: we 
should escape our “subjectivity”, because we already met lots of traditional 
epistemological problems, like “the problem of knowledge’s definition”, “the problem 
of regress argument”, and “the problem of skepticism”, those problems are all tied to 
our subjective view of knowledge. As a result, we have to think about the possiblity of 
developing a inter-subjectivity epistemology. 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one reviews the problem 
of knowledge’s definition and finds out its solution. The conculsion is that we shall 
give up defining knowledge, because definition is unreasonable. 
Chapter two reviews the problem of regress argument and finds out the principle 
of justification. We will find that the solution of regress argument is depended on the 
attitude of how do we look at The Closure Principle.  
Chapter three reviews problems of skepticism and proofs skepticism is one kind 
of infallibilism. Then we will discuss whether we need infallible standard for 
knowledge or not. We will see infalliblism is another kind of “essentialism”, because 
it asks a very strong foundation for knowledge and will hardly be reached. So 
infalliblism should be abandoned. 
Chapter four asks question whether skepticism would never be overcame by 
traditional epistemology. Through Analysing The Principle of Cognitive Priority, 
which is holded on by Skepticism, we will find out the resource of traditional 
epistemologies’ problems. Karl Popper declared traditional epistemology is out of 
topic of science. Is Karl Popper’s theory of knowledge reasonable? Furthermore, is 
Kuhn’s theory exceeding the problem of Popper’s Falsification theory? And what is 
Kuhn’s limition? 
Chapter five reflects the term of knowledge and discusses the problems among 















inter-subjectivity epistemology is reasonable. 
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为“柏拉图的定义”， 即“S 知道 P，仅当：1.命题 P 是真的；2. S 相信 P；3. S
















程。”详见：Alvin Goldman. The Internalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge[A] in Midwest Studies in 










































                                                        
① 波普尔自己是这样解释他为什么没有展开论证的，“我的第一个论点就其只作说明而不作论证而言，它
是说，传统的认识论把注意力集中在第二世界即主观意义的知识上，离开了对科学知识的研究。”请见：









































































器基本上都是传统知识论中所谓的“闭合原则” (the closure principle of knowing) 
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